Disaster Recovery in New Zealand

- The Land of the Volcanos, Earthquakes and Tornados

Elizabeth Coulter
Director Information Technology Services
The University of Auckland

13th July 2012



Disaster Recovery in NZ

Agenda

- Background NZ Universities
- NZ Natural Hazards
- The Christchurch Earthquake and University of Canterbury Case Study
- Other Hazards
- The University of Auckland DR Case Studies
- Crisis Management and DR University of Auckland

NZ Universities

NZ Universities EFTS/FTE


University	Students (EFTS)	Staff (FTE)
The University of Auckland	32,654	4,725
Auckland University of Technology	18,952	1,916
Waikato	10,415	1,537
Massey	20,119	3,047
Victoria	17,025	1,871
Canterbury	15,674	1,902
Lincoln	2,654	652
Otago	19,918	3,751
TOTAL	137,411	19,401

3

NZ Universities

Research & Education Advanced Network NZ








NZ Natural Hazards

The Ring of Fire




http://www.enchantedlearning.com/subjects/volcano/ringoffire/

Volcanoes and earthquake-prone regions all round the Pacific.

The Pacific Ocean is shrinking as the surrounding plates converge on it.

The Atlantic doesn't have subduction zones because it is still expanding

Deep Earthquakes




Deep earthquakes have less impact

7


Deep Earthquakes

7.0 earthquake felt in Wellington



Source: Dominion Post


Shallow Earthquakes



Shallow earthquakes have the greatest impact

9

NZ Natural Hazards



Auckland's Quakes:

Magnitude: size of the earthquake MM: how the earthquake was felt.

1835 25k distance, MM>7, Magnitude 5.5-6.5

1891 60km distance MM6, Magnitude 5.7-5.8

1974, >200km distance MM5, Magnitude 5.9

Little damage



Quake Risk on Campuses - UoA

City & Grafton


- **500 years MM6.72**
- 1000 years MM7.08
- **10000 years- MM8.08**

Epsom

- **500 years MM6.73**
- 1000 years MM7.08
- 10000 years-MM8.06

Tamaki

- 500 years -MM6.80
- 1000 years MM7.16
- 10000 years-MM8.14



Epsom


11

NZ Natural Hazards

Auckland Volcanos

Auckland Volcanic Field

This map depicts the approximate extent of the Auckland Volcanic Field as determined by existing cones locations. Shown in light blue is a circle of radius 5 kilometres, the planned extent of the evacuation zone. Highlighted in green are the two locations at which the Auckland isthmus reaches its narrowest extents and in dark blue the four primary bridges connecting Auckland.




Map by Erik Tomsen Datum: New Zealand 1949 Map Grid

A STATE OF THE STA				
Source	Hazards to UoA	Likelihood		
Andesite volcanoes (e.g. Taranaki, Ngauruhoe,	Minor ash fall 0-1 cm.	Likely to occur once or twice every 50 years		
Ruapehu)	Possible impacts to electrical systems, corrosion of metal,			
>200 km from campus	communications, water supply etc (c.f. Ruapehu 1995-1996)			
AVF – basalt eruption in Auckland region	Likely hazards: ash fall (1-20 cm) and earthquakes. Possible hazards: lava flows.	Unlikely in next 50 years. Likely in next 3,000 years		
(5 -20 km from campus)				
	Ash will impact water and electrical utilities. Some building damage. Increased maintenance required.			
	Lava flows, if present, will cause complete destruction of			
	structures in their path and cause fires.			
Rhyolite volcanoes (e.g. Taupo, Okataina)	Thick ash fall possible, 0-10 cm.	Unlikely in next 50 years Likely in next 3,000 years		
>200 km from campus.	Significant impacts on lifelines, health hazards etc. (c.f. Pinatubo, Philippines, 1991)			
AVF – basalt eruption near campus	Hazards: Volcanic landform (e.g. scoria cone) formation;	Unlikely in next 50 years Likely in next 10,000 years		
•	earthquakes; volcanic gas;			
(within 5 km of campus,	pyroclastic surges; ash fall;			
including directly below campus)	lightning; lava bombs; lava flows; fire fountaining.			
	Impact will range from total destruction of buildings and			
	life, through to major damage,			
	depending on distance to vent.			

Volcano Risk





Source: Jan Lindsay & Phil Shane, Determining Volcanic Risk in New Zealand (DEVORA)

13

NZ Natural Hazards

Tsunami risk





- 50% chance within the next 50 years impacting Auckland
- Tsunami originating from a large earthquake off the west coast of South America
- Wave heights of up to 4 metres

Other distant tsunami sources are earthquakes in other parts of the Pacific ocean are more frequent but waves are likely to be much smaller.


Earthquakes in the outer Hauraki Gulf or Firth of Thames could generate a tsunami. Probability: than 1% in the next 50 years

Volcanic eruptions from the Auckland Volcanic Field could also produce tsunami though wave heights are unlikely to be much larger than 1m.


Of the 32 recorded tsunami to hit New Zealand between 1840 and 1995, 12 detected within Auckland waters.
All were small (less than 2 metres).

Source: Auckland Regional Council

Tsunami







Likely sources of tsunami

15

NZ Natural Hazards

Tsunami: UoA on a Hill



Tornado



One man dead as tornado wreaks havoc in Auckland

Published: 3:13PM Tuesday May 03, 2011 Source: ONE News

Email this article Print this article Text size + -Share on Facebook Share on Twitter

The tornado that ripped through Auckland today sounded like a "747 was flying right overhead", a witness says.

One man was killed in the tornado which struck first in Albany about 3pm.

More than a dozen people suffered injuries, some of which were critical, as the twister left a trail of destruction in Auckland suburbs.

One eyewitness said the tornado came within 200 metres of a school.



The tornado left a trail of destruction in Albany, - Source: ONE

17

The Christchurch Earthquake



Christchurch Earthquake

Saturday 4 September 2010, Magnitude 7.1, 4:35am, depth 10 kilometres, widespread damage, no direct fatalities.

<u>Tuesday 22 February 2011, Magnitude 6.3, 12:51pm</u>. Depth of 5km, <u>MM</u> IX, among the strongest ever recorded globally in an urban area and in total 185 people killed




Digital Archive: http://www.ceismic.org.nz

19

Christchurch Earthquake

Christchurch Earthquakes: http://www.christchurchquakemap.co.nz/



University of Canterbury Case Study



University of Canterbury Case Study

UC IT DR during the earthquakes

- fend for yourself
- assist others who are in a less fortunate position



University of Canterbury Case Study

Good design

- Primary and Secondary data centres were designed with seismic activity in mind
- The remote access facility was ready to scale because of previous concerns over bird flu
- Terminal servers were quickly provisioned via UC's virtual environment to allow up to 1000 concurrent users

...... and a little bit of luck

- ISP data centre remained operational despite some damage
- No fibre damage between UC and our ISP



Andy Keiller
IT Operations and Infrastructure Manager
Learning Resources
University of Canterbury

23

University of Canterbury Case Study

Immediate IT Challenges

- To provide communication channels to staff and students
 - Web site, e-mail, Facebook
- Provision remote access to key members of staff who previously had no provision
- To rescue PCs from damaged building because they had "specialist" software and key data with no other "backup"
- Limited numbers of IT staff available to assist



Andy Keiller
IT Operations and Infrastructure Manager
Learning Resources
University of Canterbury

University of Canterbury Case Study

Medium term IT challenges

- How to provision technology into the "tented" village to allow teaching to continue
- Coping with the increase in the number of video captured lectures (50 hours to over 300 hours)
- Working with our ISP to allow students financial relief because of increased internet traffic to on-line resources
- Provisioning laptops for remote access as most of the kit couldn't be accessed from our damaged buildings



Andy Keiller
IT Operations and Infrastructure Manager
Learning Resources
University of Canterbury

25



- The University of Canterbury will resort to teaching students from an interim tented campus after February's magnitude 6.3 earthquake.
- Four large marquees will be set up on campus to be used as teaching and working spaces for staff and students.
- Any buildings that have not been through the five-step building assessment process will be cordoned off to avoid any avoidable health and safety risks.
- Students and staff are advised to bring drinking water and hand sanitiser with them
- A full day of teaching will be offered on Saturday March

University of Canterbury Case Study

Lessons learned

- IT DR plans need to be generic as there will be an element of thinking on your feet
- You will need strong relationships with your key suppliers
- Plan to ensure that people are not the single point of failure
- People are your strongest assets
- Be prepared to act militarily
- The goal should be to not just to survive but also thrive during times of adversity



Andy Keiller
IT Operations and Infrastructure Manager
Learning Resources
University of Canterbury

27

Other Hazards



Other Hazards

Auckland Power





29

Other Hazards

- Flood
- Fire
- Leaking Air-conditioning
- Burst Water Pipe
- Drainage
- Air-conditioning Failure
- Building Control System Failure
- On-campus Power Issues
- Failure during testing of a UPS/Generator

The University of Auckland DR Case Studies



Crisis Management/DR The University of Auckland

UoA Information

- Staff: 4725 FTE; 6900 staff headcount
- Students: 32,654 EFTS; 38000+ student
- Times Higher Ed supplement: #1 in NZ, #6 in Australasia.
- CIO Magazine NZ MIS100: 7th largest IT operation in NZ
- Five campuses North Island. 4 in the City, 1 Northland, many satellite locations
- 810 wireless APs, 1750 edge switches

UoA Information

- 2 Main Data Centres + third at the Medical School
- 24/7 operation
- VLANs span data centers to support DR.
- 2515 (Physical 600, Virtual 1915)
- Main DC use is VMware: 2x 10Gb Ethernet, 2x 8Gb Fibre Channel, 8 core, 288GB RAM, supporting 40+ guests
- 500TB NAS service with 4x 10Gb connections
- TSM backup service with multiple 10Gb connections (6TB a night of backup traffic)
- Virtualized Oracle environment for all our ERP systems.

33

Crisis Management/DR The University of Auckland

Auckland Experience

- 2011 Large BCP Project
- 2011/2012 Crisis Management Scenarios
 - September 2011: Crisis Planning for a Tornado
 - Would lose both Data Centres (In the same street)
- 2012 New Risk Management Group (PARCO)
- 2011/2012 ITS DR Project
 - Scenario Planning and Gap Analysis
 - Documentation
 - Communication Plan
 - Update of ITS Crisis Plan
 - Practice DR Test Scheduled April 2012 (Overshadowed by Actual Events)
- Early 2012 DR Incidents

Auckland Experience

- October 25th 2011: Pipe Line Power Issues
 - Reliance on Generators. Secondary DC had generator capacity issues
- January 6th 2012: Primary Data Centre Air-conditioning Failure
 - DC Overheating caused by Building Control System
- March 9th 2012: Secondary Data Centre Power Loss
 - UPS Failure
 - Incorrect Power Diagrams
- April 2012: Gas pipe hit while building new DC

35

Crisis Management/DR The University of Auckland

January 6th 2012: Primary DC

- Approximately 4pm to 8:30pm.
- Primary Data Centre Air-conditioning Failure
- Caused by a Building Control System failure
- Manual override was too late
- Hot spots
- Found one of our Juniper boxes could run at high temperatures
- Systems shutdown in an unordered fashion
- SAN first before issue was even escalated
- Property addressing another issues (1 person)
- Ventilation backup didn't work
- Many ITS staff were on holidays
- 1/2 Servers shutdown before cooling came back (leaving us in a ½ state)

January 6th 2012: Primary DC - Issues

- Impacted user access, Student Services Online, Student File storage, LMS, some Library Services.
- eResearch system failure
- Many key systems did remain working, including email
- Restored within the same business day.
- The ½ state caused Issues with recovery
- Issues with Staff accessing systems from home (Yubikey)
- Issues with VCentre Management didn't work
- Post Implications of heat exposure (Vendor Relationship)
- Problems communicating with Faculty and Library staff
- Reliance on particular staff

37

Crisis Management/DR The University of Auckland

March 9th 2012: Secondary Data Centre Power Loss

- Day before the UPS failed on mains
- Needed to put data centre in bypass to remove the UPS
- Incorrect Power documents and Power switched off at 8am
- Power switched on and systems returned in an adhoc manner

March 9th 2012: Secondary Data Centre Power Loss

- Again Virtual Servers in ½ state: Vcentre didn't working
- Services affected included identity, Student Services Online Email, LMS, Virtual Worlds, File Service, some SharePoint sites and various Development/Test/Dr environments. Other key systems did remain working, including ERP Systems.
- Communications issues New Incident Manager who was not given the SMS service password
- Issues in the order in which systems powered on
- TSM Backup failed to recover (Vendor Relationship)
- Issue with the email setup
- Issue with the new storage system authentication source
- Systems recovered in 4 hours
- (UPS recovery Incident of contractor not following procedures)

39

Crisis Management/DR The University of Auckland

Actions

ITS

- Vcentre Management Architecture (Separate VMfarm)
- Replication of Authentication Systems & Documentation
- Control shutdown and startup (manual override)
- Communication Plan
- Update ITS Crisis Management Plan
- Undertake more Scenario plans (Gap analysis)
- Undertake additional DR Tests system by system
- Review Roles and Responsibilities of Faculties and other Service Divisions
- First Risk Case from PARCO
- Document everything Post review as soon as possible

Addressing Lessons Learnt

Property Services

- Replace Building Control System
- Replication for the Building Control System
- Review Air-conditioning redundancy
- Review Power Documents

Both - New DC

- Ensure all documentation from the new DC is reviewed
- Implement new DC as Tier 3

41

Data Centres




Data Centres



43



Tamaki Innovation Campus Data Centre





Tamaki Data Centre







Tamaki Data Centre

- 85 IT Equipment Racks
 - 32 racks will be for High Performance Computing (eResearch)
 - 60 Racks will be 48RU high giving a total RU capacity amongst the 60 racks of 2880RU.
- 15 Kw capacity per rack average
 - caters eResearch loads of up to 35kW 44Kw's per rack
- Power Usage Efficiency (PUE) of 1.4
 - For each 1000w of power consumed only 400w will be required to treat the heat. (70% of the year)
- 2.4MW of Generator Capacity
 - Starting with 2x650w generators
- 1.2Mw of Cooling Capacity
 - For the rare times when free cooling is not possible the cooling plant will be capable of cooling 1.2Mw of power load.

47

Tamaki Data Centre

- Over 375Ssqm
 - The total facility at the Tamaki campus will utilised over 375 square metres of land.
- 2 Tonne per square metre of floor loading.
 - Designed to handle rack loads of 2 tonne/sqm. <u>10G</u> connectivity between OGGDC and TDC
- Dark fibre and DWDM
 - Installed in a ring formation to the City Campus
 - 10G between data centres.
 - Future REEANZ link to the site



Crisis Management

FIG. 1: RESILIENCE MANAGEMENT PLAN RELATIONSHIPS



Level 1

Applies to everyone

U of A Resilience Response Plan Overall policy framework & principles, fire & evac applying to everything, indicating what plans are where.

Applies to parts of the organisation

U of A Crisis Management Plan Co-ordination and support of response & recovery efforts

Level 2

Specific to Faculty / Service Division Faculty / Service Division Resilience Management Plans Specific to operations / business areas.
Contingency plans & procedures.


Level 3

Task & business unit specific

Relevant BAU Plans & Procedures

UoA Crisis Management

FIG. 4: RESILIENCE RESPONSE PROCESS THE UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND



51

UoA Crisis Management

- The University's response priorities:
 - 1. Safety & security of people;
 - 2. Protecting critical infrastructure and services;
 - 3. Maintaining the Universities core business functions of research; and teaching and learning;
 - 4. Protecting the environment
- Emergency Operations Centre
 - Primary and Alternative locations
 - Mobile location widespread geographical disruption

ager	nent			
	Crisis Level	Risk Level	Definition - ITS	Impact on University
	Disaster	Very High	Immediate action required by ITS Crisis Committee with detailed planning, allocation of resources and regular monitoring	Significant impact to critical University processes Chair of ITS Crisis Committee may rely on the CIO or UEMT for direction if the event constitutes an Emergency Response Plan trigger
UEMT aware ITS Crisis Committee initiated	Emergency	High	ITS Associate Director attention and accountability needed, appropriate ITS Management involved. ITS Crisis Committee activated	Significant impact to more than one process, faculty, building or user group
ITS Crisis Committee aware	Alert	Medium	ITS Associate Directors and appropriate ITS Management must be alerted to the issue to understand situation and progress	Limited impact to the University, impacts to a single user group, faculty or building
	Watch	Low	Service Delivery Owners monitor and manage by routine procedures. No Associate Director involvement	Some impact to the University if the situation escalates further
	Normal	Very Low	Manage by routine procedures. No ITS Mgmt involved	Low impact to ITS or the University – business as usual

53

ITS Crisis Management

ITS Crisis Ma

What have I learnt:

- BCP and DR are not project
- Documentation is Important
- Practice Makes Perfect Think on your Feet
- Mind the Gaps
- Be Prepared BCP, Access, Replication
- Communication!
- Stakeholder Expectations
- Protect your Techs
- In an Incident Document Everything
- Vendor Relationships
- People are your greatest Asset
- Learn from your Experience



It's a Beautiful Place







Applific designation succession

Questions?



57