SIP ain't SIMPLE



Rodney McDuff Strategic Technologies Group Information Technology Services

The University of Queensland

- About UQ.
- Some Business Drivers.
- SIP Prelude.
- · SIP Bestiary.
- Where have we been today?
- Issues along the way.
- · Where do we want to go tomorrow?


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
About UQ




- 37K student.
 - 17% international students (from 121 countries).
 - 26% Postgrads.
- 5250 Staff.
 - 2191 Academics.
 - 3059 General Staff.
 - Approx. 7000 Fringe Dwellers.
- 3 main campuses.
 - St. Lucia, Ipswich and Gatton.
 - Operates about 50 other sites.
- 18000+ computers.
 - 30+ routers, 700+ switches, 200+ AP.
 - 11K phone extensions.

About UQconnect • UQ's ISP focused at staff, students and alumni's residential and personal needs. – Over 10K customers. – Dialup, ADSL, iBurst, Web Hosting.







What we want to do



- Construct an *open* flexible scalable *multi-modal* communication solution.
- Based on suitable freely available and commercial products.
- Use converged communications identifier ie email address.
- Revolutionize the work place and the campus community through an integrated collaboration infrastructure based on video, instant messaging and presence enabled services and information exchange.

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Drivers



- Old, unsupported PBX.
 - NEC 2400 Ultra Module Group (UMG).
 - 1988 technology.
 - 50% 16 years old.
 - 25% 13 years old.
 - Unsupported since 31/12/2005.
 - Mitigated some risk with IPX-M.
- Want to move virtually everything to VoIP.

Drivers



Cost savings

- Cheaper calls? Maybe.
 - SIP-to-SIP voice call data charges cost 0.4 cent/min thru AARNet.
 - If there was any one out there to call.
- Cheaper Infrastructure? Maybe.
 - One network rather than two. But network needs.
 major work for QoS, redundancy and DR.
- Cheaper Operational Costs? Possibly.
 - Cheaper maintenance and management.
 - Cheaper and faster moves, adds and changes.

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Drivers



Cost savings

- Less PSTN and mobile calls? Maybe.
 - · Edith Cowen University.
- Less staff? Maybe.
 - Dartmouth College http://www.educause.edu/LIVE056.
- Greater efficiencies? Definitely!!

From surveys completed by Sage Research and Forrester Consulting.

- Save 32 min/day reaching coworkers.
- Save 43 min/day from using unified messaging.
- Save 31 min/day by using IM.
- 25% say projects halt until key decision makers found.
- 37% say save 15-30 min/day reaching coworker with single address.
- 37% say presence would significantly streamline communications.

Drivers



- Network management
 - Students want to use Skype and other IMs.
 - Staff want to use Skype and other IMs to collaborate.
 - But good network faseists managers want:
 - · To know who is using their networks.
 - Staff and students to be accountable for their (mis)deeds.
 - To know that nice, well behaved applications are being used on their networks.
 - To eliminate Skype from their networks (because it too good at the evil things its does).
 - P2P. Endpoint defined by login but IP.
 - Constantly evolving to bypass firewalls, NATs and access control.
 - Heavily obfuscated and encrypted.
 - Application-to-Application communication through Skype.
 - But need to replace Skype and IMs with friendlier apps.
 - · Can't leave a vacuum.

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Drivers



- VoIP is inevitable.
 - Only a question of when you deploy.
- Our duty to grease the wheels of collaboration.
 - Intra-institution.
 - Inter-institution.
 - eScience grants favouring inter-institution collaboration and federation.

Drivers



- VolP for UQconnect.
 - Over 1200 ADSL customers and growing.
 - Over 100 iBurst customers and growing fast.
 - Need VoIP product to help maintain growth.
 - Provide DID numbers to staff, students and alumni. for residential and personal use.
 - DIDs follow students from house to house.
 - Enable home and remote workers.
 - Cheap PSTN calls for all.

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Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)





- · HTTP like protocol over UDP, TCP, TLS or SCTP
 - Originally described in RFC 2543, obsoleted by RFC 3261.
 - Consists of:
 - · Headers and Bodies.
 - · Request and Responses.
 - Signaling protocol for creating, modifying, and terminating sessions with one or more participants.
- · Requests:
 - REGISTER, INVITE, ACK, BYE, CANCEL, OPTIONS (RFC 3261).
 - PRACK (RFC 3262).
 - SUBSCRIBE, NOTIFY (RFC 3265).
 - INFO (RFC 2976).
 - REFER (RFC 3515).
 - MESSAGE (RFC 3428).
 - UPDATE (RFC 3311).
 - PUBLISH (RFC 3903).
 - SERVICE, BENOTIFY (Microsoft Proprietary).


Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)



- Reponses.
 - 1xx Informational.
 - 100 Trying, 180 Ringing, 183 Session Progress.
 - 2xx Successful.
 - 200 OK, 202 Accepted.
 - 3xx Redirection.
 - 301 Moved Permanently, 302 Moved Temporarily.
 - 4xx Request Failure.
 - 401 Unauthorized , 404 Not Found, 407 Proxy Authentication Required , 482 Loop Detected.
 - 5xx Server Failure.
 - 501 Not Implemented.
 - 6xx Global Failure.
 - · 603 Decline.







RTP, SRTP and ZRTP



- Media Transport Protocol.
 - Audio and Video Codecs.
- RTP Realtime Transport Protocol (RFC 3550).
 - Over UDP.
 - 2 streams. Media and Control (RTCP).
- SRTP Secure Realtime Transport Protocol (RFC 3711).
 - sdescriptions.
 - Key exchange in SDP payloads.
 - · Security requires SIP exchange over TLS.
 - MIKEY Multimedia Internet KEYing (RFC 3830).
 - · Key exchange by IKE.
- ZRTP (IETF Internet Draft draft-zimmermann-avt-zrtp-01.txt).
 - Zfone http://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/zfone/index.html>.
 - Shim in network stack.
 - Key exchange by Diffie-Hellman.
- See next session: "Enable Secure Realtime Media with SIP" Robert Dolphin.

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Codecs



Number	Bit rate (kbps)	Sampling rate (kHz)	Frame size (ms)	MOS (Mean Opinion Score) 1-5	Ethernet Bandwith (kbps)
G.711	64	8	Sampling	4.1	87.2
G.721	32	8	Sampling		
G.722	64	16	Sampling		79.6
G.722.1	24/32	16	20		
G.723	24/40	8	Sampling		
G.723.1	5.6/6.3	8	30	3.8-3.9	21.9
G.726	16/24/32/40	8	Sampling	3.85	55.2
G.728	16	8	2.5	3.61	31.5
G.729	8	8	10	3.92	31.2
GSM	13	8	22.5	3.7	30
Speex	8, 16, 32	2.15-24.6 (NB) 4-44.2 (WB)	30 (NB) 34 (WB)	. 27%	24.8
iLBC	8	13.3	30	3.85	27.7

Instant Messaging and Presence



- · Instant Messaging:
 - MESSAGE method defined in RFC 3428.
 - Page-based messaging. SMS Like.
- · Presence:
 - Presence Information Data Format (PIDF) RFC 3863.
 - · Consists of two basic states, OPEN and CLOSE.
 - · Rich Presence in extension status.
 - Peer-to-Peer.
 - Watcher SUBSCRIBEs to Presence User Agent for Presentity status.
 - PUA NOTIFYs Watcher when status changes.
 - Watcher aggregates forked replies.
 - Presence Agent.
 - · PUA(s) PUBLISH status to Presence Agent.
 - · Watcher SUBSCRIBEs to Presence Agent.
 - · Presence Agent NOTIFYs Watcher when status changes.
 - PA aggregates status from PUA(s).

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Instant Messaging and Presence



 SIMPLE. (SIP Instant Messaging and Presence Leveraged Extensions.)

- Still just an 4 RFCs and a set of Internet Drafts.
- Session-based IM. le. Group Chats
 - Setup via INVITE and SDP payload.
 - Message Session Relay Protocol (MSRP) between endpoints.
 - Session can offer multi-modal communication types. Voice, video, text....
- Extended Presence Data Model.
- Partial PUBLISH and NOTIFY.
- XMPP

(Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol.)

- RFC 392[0-3] since 2004. (Adaptation of Jabber protocol.)
- Underlies GoogleTalk. Transports for AIM, MSN, Yahoo, ICQ, IRC, ...
- Federated like SIP.
- Next IM and Presence contender?

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SIP Bestiary: User Agents (UA):



- Devices that end users actually use to send and receive calls.
 - User Agent Client (UAC).
 - User Agent Server (UAS).
 - · Listens typically on port 5060 TCP/UDP.
 - Some UAs choose port automatically.
 - Various Firewall Issues.
 - SIP Keep-a-lives. Frequent OPTIONS and REGISTER.





SIP Bestiary: SIP Proxies



- Primarily plays the role of routing and enforcing policy.
 - Usually only modify requests/responses for routing purposes.
 - Generally do not participate in RTP streams.
- Other Optional Functions.
 - Registrar.
 - · Authenticates UACs.
 - User Location Service.
 - Translates AOR URI to Contact URI(s).
 - Redirect Service.
 - · Handle events like call forwarding.

SIP Bestiary: SIP Proxies



- Examples:
 - SER/OpenSER:
 - · Actively developed open source proxy.
 - · Standards based.
 - · Rich feature set like:
 - SIP over UDP/TCP/TLS, SIMPLE, SIMPLE2Jabber, LCR, ENUM, Radius/database integration and many more
 - SBC feature like FW/NAT transversal, RTP proxy, DoS mitigation
 - fine control and manipulation of SIP packets.
 - Allows protocol repair.

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SIP Bestiary: SIP Proxies



- Examples:
 - NEC SV 7000:
 - NEC's Enterprise Telephony Solution.
 - · Only believe in numbers.
 - · Only believes in UDP.
 - SRTP by MIKEY variant.
 - IMHO. Just replacing copper with IP and SIP.
 - Seems a lot of Telephony Vendors do this.

SIP Bestiary: SIP Proxies



- Examples:
 - Microsoft Live Communications Server 2005:
 - Marketed as "standards based collaboration suite that leverages Instant Messaging and Presence" which also is capable of voice and video communications over SIP.
 - (In marketing, truth is the first casualty.)
 - Tight integration with Exchange, Outlook, Office Products etc.
 - (One might even say restrictive.)
 - Only works with Office Communicator and Windows Messenger V5.1 UAs.

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SIP Bestiary: B2BUAs Back-to-Back User Agents



- Concatenation of a UAC and UAS.
- Receives requests, processes them and generate new requests.
 - Signaling terminates one on side and regenerates on the other. (Different Call-IDs.)
 - Optionally RTP may terminate one on side and regenerates on the other.
 - · Possible different codecs. le. transcoding.
 - Can monitor the media stream and provide features based on DMTF signaling.
 - Maintains dialog state.

SIP Bestiary: B2BUAs Back-to-Back User Agents



- · Examples:
 - Asterisk:
 - · actively developed open source software PABX.
 - features a high quality voicemail system, conference room, IVR and phone queue.
 - · only supports SIP over UDP.
 - SRTP in v1.4, TCP/TLS as patch.
 - Can't have multiple user REGISTrations.
 - Asterisk is NOT a Proxy.

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SIP Bestiary: B2BUAs Back-to-Back User Agents



- Examples:
 - Cisco Call Manager v5.
 - An enterprise IP telephony call-processing solution that is scalable, distributable and highly available.
 - Packaged as an appliance. Single firmware image (Linux).
 - · Call Admission Control (CAC) thru RSVP.
 - Manage/Provision Cisco and third party SIP phones.
 - Supports KPML (Keypad Markup Language) ID draft-ietf-sipping-kpml.
 - · Still undergoing evaluation...

SIP Bestiary: SIP Gateways



- Protocol Transcoders
 - Signaling: SIP into H.323/SCCP/SS7.
 - Media: RTP into TDM.
 - SIP and RTP flows initiate/terminate on device.
- · Examples:
 - Cisco 2821 Integrated Services Router: With High-Density Analog and Digital Extension Module for Voice and Fax.



- Asterisk:
 - With various E1 cards. Digium, Sangoma,...
 - SIP/PSTN, SIP/IAX, SIP/H.323, SIP/SCCP, SIP/MGCP.
 - · Currently only SIP over UDP.


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
SIP Bestiary: SBCs

Session Border Controllers



- Firewall for VolP. (Usually takes the form of a B2BUA.)
 - An RTP Proxy and help stop service theft.
 - Repair and fixes protocol problems.
 - Aid NAT transversal for UAs .
 - Perform protocol transcoding both in the signaling and data channels.
 - Hide SIP topology behind it.
 - Security and hardening again DoS
 - Call Admission Control.
 - QoS enforcement.
 - Create and control firewall pinholes to allow VoIP access into the network.
- Examples:
 - Jasomi Peerpoint C100.
 - Cisco Multiservice IP-to-IP Gateway.





Issues: Firewalls



- SIP is not firewall friendly.
 - SIP/RTP paths can be different.
 - BYE/ACK may go point-to-point
- UQ has > 50 firewalls within network
 - Many varieties. PIX, FreeBSD,...
- · UQ has Quotient FW around everything.
 - Quotient == UQ in-house IMS based on Cisco SSG.
 - Nothing get in or out until user authenticates.
 - SIP setups session (INVITE/200 OK/ACK) thru one path.
 - RTP wants to go point-to-point but can't.
 - · Everyone hears the sounds of silence.

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Issues: Firewalls



- Solutions:
 - SBC at network perimeter.
 - Won't help with internal firewalls.
 - SIP-aware or UPnP firewalls.
 - Need to replace a lot of firewalls.
 - RTP proxy.
 - SER/OpenSER has a module for this.
 - Still wont help with internal firewalls.
 - Need to develop minimal set of static rules.
 - Need to control range of ports UAs listen to.

Issues: NATs



- SIP is not NAT friendly.
 - IPs in Headers and SDP inconsistent with source/destination addresses.
 - Use UAs that determine their external facing IPs
 - STUN (Simple Traversal of UDP Through NATs). RFC 3489.
 - TURN (Traversal Using Relay NAT) ID draft-rosenbergmidcom-turn.
 - ICE (Interactive Connectivity Establishment) ID draftrosenberg-sipping-ice.
 - Use SIP Proxies/SBC fix up inconsistencies on the fly.
 - SER/OpenSER has modules for this.

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Issues: Converged SIP Identities



- Want a converged communications identifier
 - sip:r.mcduff@uq.edu.au.
 - mailto:r,mcduff@uq.edu.au.
 - pres:r.mcduff@uq.edu.au
 - im:r.mcduff@uq.ed.au
- But 12 digit key pads will be around for a long time.
- Need SIP aliases. Like email aliases.
- Issue user a number-like URI aliased to their AOR as well.
- SER/OpenSER support aliases.



Issues: Quality of Service

- Poor voice quality mainly due to:
 - Packet latency, jitter and loss.
 - · Mitigated by Network QoS.
 - Echo. Analog X-fed at remote end-point.
 - Mitigated by hardware/software echo cancellers.
- State of UQ Network.
 - Core is QoS ready today.
 - Rest of network is another story.
 - Long and costly venture to upgrade.
 - Still going to proceed anyway (in a staged approach).

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Issues: Quality of Service

- VoIP servers on 802.1P VLANs in CORE network.
- Managed 802.1P VLANs only for Managed Handsets.
 - Users expect something that looks like a telephone to have telephone quality.
- Everything else overwrite user set DSCP as soon as possible.
 - QoS tag everything that looks like a SIP/RTP packet.
 - Destination or source is SIP server or RTP proxy.
 - Keep fingers crossed.
- Retag DSCP when peering with AARNet CAC system.

Issues: Live Communications Server



- Standards are good.
 - Aids interoperability between products.
 - · Gives choices to the customer.
 - IMHO, this is the last thing certain vendors want.
- RFC 3261:
 - MUST support SIP over UDP. SHOULD should TCP/TLS.
 - LCS only supports SIP over TCP/TLS.
 - MUST support Digest method of authentication
 - LCS only supports proprietary NTLM and Kerberos methods.
- SIMPLE:
 - LCS doesn't support PUBLISH method. Uses SERVICE method for same purpose.
 - Uses BENOTIFY rate than NOTIFY.
- Just the tip of the iceberg.

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Issues: Live Communications Server



- I need to support Office Communicator and other UAs.
- · If I could use LCS to do this I would.
 - Tight integration with Outlook, Exchange, etc.
 - · a powerfully argument you can't ignore.
 - Plus it would drive "lesser" standards-based clients.
 - SIP Handsets, third party softphones, ATAs, ADSL Modems,...
- Only one choice.
 - Support 2 (or more) separate SIP infrastructures.
 - Still need to integrate them all.
 - · LCS make this hard as well.
 - This somewhat confuses my unified communications identifier.
- Bottom Line. MS business arrogance is causing me pain.
 - Thank you Bill.

Issues: SIP Security



- Inherits all the attacks on layer 2,3,4.
 - ARP poisoning, IP spoofing, malformed packets, TCP/UDP floods/replays, DDoS, ...
- · SIP vulnerable to many attacks on layer 7.
 - Confidentiality:
 - · Man-in-the-Middle, Tools like VOMIT, Oreka.
 - Integrity:
 - Spoofed headers, RTP tampering/insertion, DHCP/TFTP insertion attacks.
 - Attacker masquerading as legitimate user.
 - Availability:
 - REGISTER/INVITE floods, CANCEL/BYE attacks. Malformed requests/responses.
- And then there's SPIT.
 - SPam over Internet Telephony.

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Issues: SIP Security



- · What to do?
 - Enforcing outbound proxy and authenticate all requests.
 - Atleast you'll know whose account has been compromised.
 - Use SIP over TLS and SRTP where possible.
 - · Hop-to-Hop integrity and confidentiality.
 - Requires transitive trust of SIP proxies.
 - Use S/MIME of SIP bodies (defined in RFC 3261).
 - End-to-End integrity and (some) confidentiality.
 - · Doesn't protect headers unless using Tunneled SIP.
 - Still can't protect some headers. Via. Record-Route, Caller-ID, Cseq.
 - Needs personal PKI and associated infrastructure.
 - S/MIME for SIP has not been as widely deployed.
 - Hope for the future.
 - SIP SAML Profile and Binding (ID draft-ietf-sip-saml)

Issues: SIP Security



- What to do?
 - Use a SBC or its ilk.
 - Use Access Lists.
 - · Only peer with domains you trust.
 - Use SIP vulnerability tests/security tools:
 - SiVuS.
 http://www.vopsecurity.org/html/sivus.html
 - PROTOS C07-SIP test suite.
 http://www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/protos/testing/c07/sip>
 - SFTF.
 http://www.sipfoundry.org/sftf>
 - Codenomicon SIP Test Tool.
 http://www.codenomicon.com/products/telecommunications/sip
 - · Unfortunately these types of tools still in their infancy.
- Don't worry. Be happy!!!

